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Abstract 
 
At independence all the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) inherited a 
extensive system of social welfare, including a comprehensive pay as you go pension 
system characterised by low retirement ages, relatively generous opportunities for early 
retirement for selected groups and high replacement rates. The economic dislocation of 
the early 1990s had significant consequences for the pension systems in the region. 
Rising unemployment and economic restructuring reduced the contribution base, 
increasing system dependency rates. In the face of falling public expenditure many 
countries undertook wide ranging reforms of the pension system – including tightening 
eligibility criteria, increasing retirement ages, and moves away from defined benefits 
towards defined contribution systems. This paper details the impact of transition on 
pension systems during the 1990s, through to the mid 2000s in the region as a whole. It 
then focuses on the first wave of pension reforms and the current pension systems in the 
region today in four case study countries: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan.   4 
Pensions and Social Protection in Central Asia and South 
Caucasus: Developments in the post-Soviet era 
 
I. Introduction  
 
At independence all the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) inherited a extensive 
system of social welfare, including a comprehensive pay as you go pension system 
characterised by low retirement ages (60 for men and 55 for women) and relatively 
generous opportunities for early retirement for selected groups of workers such as miners, 
agricultural workers, members of the armed forces, ballerinas and ‘hero mothers’ 
amongst many other. Pensions were calculated as a fixed earning related component plus 
an additional component based on years of services which took into account periods of 
employment, child care and numerous other ‘special circumstances’. As most Soviet 
citizens were employees of the state, either in industry or as agricultural workers, or fell 
into some other special category, entitlement to the government financed Old Age 
Pension was almost universal. For the minority of those who had not accumulated 
sufficient years of service to qualify, the Social Pension provided a safety net of around 
the minimum wage. 
 
In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the newly 
independent Countries of the FSU underwent a period of severe economic dislocation. 
The interruption of traditional trade relations along with the withdrawal of subsidies from 
Moscow resulted in a dramatic contraction in GDP. Between 1990 and 1995, GDP per 
capita more than halved in all the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, with the 
notable exception of Uzbekistan (see Figure 1 below). Since the mid 1990s there has 
been a slow return to positive economic growth (see Alam et al, 2005; Falkingham, 
2005). However, a decade after independence only Armenia and Kazakhstan were back at 
pre independence levels. Even by 2007, levels of GDP per capita in Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan were still at around four fifths of those pre independence, whilst  in Moldova 
GDP per capita remained at less than two thirds (62%) and Tajikistan just over half 
(54%).    5 
 
Fig 1: Trends in real GDP per capita, 1990-2007
 (1990=100; constant $US in 2000 prices)
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Source: UNICEF Transmonee Database 2009 
 
The relatively generous Soviet pension system combined with a rapidly contracting 
contributions base due to falling tax revenues as State run enterprises contracted, 
unemployment rose and the informal sector expanded, resulted in most pension systems 
in the region rapidly becoming unsustainable. The growing private sector quickly learnt 
how to evade mandatory pension contributions (Seitenova and Becker, 2004). With 
declining revenues, pension funds in most countries of the FSU quickly fell into deficit 
and benefit payments fell into arrears. Rapid inflation acted to erode the value of benefits. 
For example, in 1992, consumer price inflation exceeded 3,000 percent in Kazakhstan, 
effectively reducing the value of pensions and other welfare benefits to below the 
minimum necessary for subsistence (Seitenova and Becker, 2004). The impact of the 
decline in the real value of pensions on the welfare of older people was further 
exacerbated by the contraction of non cash subsidies in areas such as health care, heating 
and sanatorium. During this period in some countries, some state enterprises offered to 
pay their contributions in kind resulting in pensioners receiving their benefits in kind. 
This was less of a problem where the in kind payments could easily be converted into   6 
cash or consumed (e.g. flour) but there were significant welfare implications when 
pensions and other benefits were paid in vodka, as was reported to be the case in one 
instance in an oblast (region) in Russia in the early 1990s (Falkingham, 1999). 
 
With problems of both fiscal sustainability and benefit adequacy, it is no surprise that 
most of the newly independent states of the FSU considered or undertook radical changes 
to their pension systems. As early as 1992, Kyrgyzstan – often considered as an early 
adopter of reform – began a process of reducing the scope of special privileges such as 
additional years of service for particular occupations. By the mid 1990s many countries 
in the region had introduced reforms, with common themes including: (i) a shift away 
from pensions based on a defined benefit towards those based defined contributions; (ii) a 
move from a PAYG to a funded system and (iii) from a system where the pension ‘risk’ 
was based on the collective, to one where risk was increasing individualised.  Most 
countries also attempted to raise the age of retirement, with mixed success.  
 
Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan introduced far reaching pension legislation in 1996 7, 
with Kyrgyzstan bringing in a notional defined benefit pension and Kazakhstan initiating 
more ambitious reform moving towards a fully funded, mandatory and individually based 
defined contribution scheme along the lines introduced in Chile in the 1980s. Other 
countries in the region were slower to reform. For example, the first wave of pension 
reform in Armenia was legislated in 2002 and implemented in 2003, whilst in others such 
as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the reform process is just beginning. 
 
This paper reviews the transformation of social protection for older people in Central 
Asia and the south Caucasus. It begins by reviewing the main features of Soviet old age 
pensions in section II. Section III then presents an overview of the demographic and 
socio economic profile of the countries in the regions, drawing out the implications for 
social protection. Particular attention is paid to the changing age structure of the 
population and labour force participation rates as well as trends in poverty. Section IV 
details the impact of transition on pension systems during the 1990s, through to the mid 
2000s in the region as a whole. Section V then focuses on the first wave of pension   7 
reforms and the current pension systems in the region today in four case study countries: 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This section draws on both published 
literature and also original analysis of recent household survey data. In particular in the 
case of Tajikistan, household survey data is used to assess how social networks and 
informal strategies, including remittances, are compensating for the inadequate provision 
by the state. Section VI then concludes, drawing out the implications for policy and 
assessing the role that social pensions may play in the region. 
 
II. The inherited legacy: Soviet old-age pensions in brief   
 
The Soviet Union provided its citizens with a comprehensive system of social protection 
that included a range of cash and non cash benefits. Social insurance benefits provided 
workers with coverage for maternity, sickness, disability, survivorship and old age whilst 
social assistance benefits were available for those with inadequate employment records to 
qualify for insurance based benefits. The system was effectively universal as the vast 
majority of the population were employed in either the military, a government 
department (e.g. education and health), a state enterprise or a state owned (sovkhoz) or 
collective (kolkhoz) farm. Full employment was guaranteed by the state and 
unemployment
1 was virtually unknown, a fact reflected in the fact that the Soviet system 
of social protection did not encompass formal unemployment benefits.   
 
The cash benefit system was supported by an extensive system of non cash benefits, 
including subsidies for heating and many foodstuffs (most notably bread) as well as 
universal education and health care, supposedly free at the point of delivery
2. In addition 
many workers received subsidised housing, kindergarten places and annual holidays in 
                                                 
1 Although there was no formal unemployment in the Soviet system, under employment was widespread, 
reflecting excess labour capacity within many enterprises. See Kaufman and Hardt, 1993 for a more 
detailed discussion. 
2 Although both education and health services were ‘free’, there is evidence that people accessing health 
care during the Soviet period, especially at tertiary level, incurred significant out of pocket costs in the form 
of gifts (both cash and in kind) to health care workers. There is also significant evidence that out of pocket 
payments rose substantially following independence. For a more extended discussion see Lewis (2000), 
Falkingham (2004) and Falkingham, Akkazieva and Baschieri (2010).   8 
sanatorium ‘owned’ by their enterprise. Entitlement to a subsidised annual holiday 
extended into retirement.  
 
Under the Soviet system, both social insurance and social assistance benefits were 
effectively non contributory in nature as no contributions were payable by the employees, 
although contributions were paid by the enterprise. Eligibility for benefits was based on 
the citizen’s employment record. This included credits for years as a university student, 
years of service in the armed forces, time out for child care as well as years of 
employment. Moreover in some occupations more than one year of service was credited 
for each year of employment. Thus in these occupations it was possible to accelerate the 
accumulation of ‘contribution years’. 
 
Normal retirement ages in the Soviet system were low, at 55 years for women (with 20 
years of service) and 60 years for men (with 25 years of service). Moreover there were 
numerous exceptions allowing people to retire earlier. People working in occupations 
classified as ‘arduous’ (such as milk maids or goat herders) or ‘hazardous’ (such as 
mining) or who had engaged in work associated with the Chernobyl disaster could retire 
between 5 10 years earlier due to these occupations attracting additional credits. An early 
pension was also available at age 50 for mothers who had raised more than 3 children or 
who had cared for a disabled child, and a woman awarded the title Hero Mother of the 
Soviet Union (awarded for 10 or more children) could retire at any age after receiving her 
award.  
 
As well as a relatively low retirement age, the normal pension formula was extremely 
generous being set at 60 percent of the highest past wages averaged over 12 months for 
workers with a full employment record. Above that the base pension was then increased 
by one percent for each year of service above the minimum. Given the relatively modest 
number of years required for a full employment record and the extensive system of 
credits, most people retired with a state old age pension providing a replacement rate in 
excess of two thirds of their previous highest wages. 
   9 
Although the eligibility criteria for an old age pension were ‘low’ by most pension 
system standards, there was still a minority of the population who failed to qualify. 
Where individuals were not eligible for an old age pension, a social pension was payable. 
This was set at the level of the minimum wage, which in turn was set in reference to the 
‘social minimum’ which was calculated by the State Statistical Agency (Goskomstat) 
using a basket of goods and services that were thought to reflect the socially acceptable 
minimum for the community. This basket allowed for a generous level of consumption of 
both food and non food items and contained relatively high proportions of high cost 
foods such as animal fat and meat, reflecting the fact that the social minimum was based 
on the idea of social solidarity rather than  simply meeting basic needs (Falkingham, 
2000). Poverty did not officially exist under the Soviet system, although it was 
recognised there were ‘maloobespechenny’ (or ‘under provisioned’) families. There was 
a distinction between ‘under provisioned’ older people who entitled to the social pension, 
and under provisioned families with children who were entitled to social assistance based 
family allowances. 
 
In summary, the main features of the Soviet Pension system were: 
•  Virtually universal coverage 
•  Non contributory for employees (contribution paid by employee) 
•  Low retirement age (60 for men and 55 for women), plus generous opportunities 
for early retirement 
•  Low eligibility requirements (minimum service record of 25 years for men and 20 
years for women) 
•  Extensive and generous system of credits (university education, military service, 
child birth, arduous and hazardous employment) 
•  Generous earning related benefit (60% of highest average earning for minimum 
service record plus 1% for each additional year above the minimum) 
•  High average replacement rate 
plus 
•  Non contributory social pension for those who were not eligible for an old age 
pension, providing a minimum income guarantee.   10 
 
The generosity of the Soviet pension system meant that even prior to the break up of the 
Soviet Union the system was coming under pressure. In August 1990, in response to the 
economic problems of the 1980s, the Soviet government took the first steps towards 
moving away from a pay as you go system towards a funded system by establishing the 
USSR Pension Fund. The Fund was established as an independent ‘financial banking 
system’, separated from the State budget and funded by contributions from all types of 
enterprises and organisations.  Through the setting up of the USSR Pension Fund, the 
Soviet Government was signalling its desire to ultimately create a funded pension system 
(Seitenova and Becker, 2004). However before this could occur the Soviet Union was 
dissolved, and in 1991 each of the newly independent states inherited their own national 
Pension Fund based on the 1990 Soviet law. In the next Section we go on to look at 
trends in the demographic and socio economic profile of the countries of Central Asia 
and the South Caucasus following independence. 
   11 
III. Demographic and socio-economic trends in Central Asia and the 
South Caucasus  
 
Demographic trends 
Declining fertility 
The republics of Central Asia and the South Caucasus exhibited the highest rates of 
fertility in the USSR and as such had relatively youthful populations. In 1989, the Total 
Fertility Rate (TFR) of 5.1 children per woman in Tajikistan was the highest in the 
Union, followed by Turkmenistan (4.3) and Uzbekistan (4.1). Fertility rates were lower in 
the South Caucasus than in Central Asia, but remained above replacement rate (i.e. 2.1 
children per woman) in both Armenia and Azerbaijan (Table 1). Over the following two 
decades, the TFR fell in all countries in the region. In part this was the continuation of an 
already established downward trend. However the decline in TFR was steeper than a pure 
trend based explanation would suggest, pointing to couples adjusting their family 
formation plans in response to the economic uncertainty and political unrest (Agadjanian 
and Ekaterina, 2003; Clifford, Falkingham and Hinde, 2010). Today in most countries in 
the region fertility levels are around or below the replacement rate, with only Tajikistan 
above three children per woman.  
  
Table 1: Trends in fertility and life expectancy, 1989-2009 
  Total fertility 
rate 
Male life expectancy 
at birth 
Female life expectancy 
at birth 
Life expectancy at 
age 60 
Both sexes  
  1989  2009  1989  2009  1989  2009  2005 201 
Armenia  2.6  1.7  69.0  70.6  74.7  77.1  19.5 
Azerbaijan  2.8  2.2  66.6  68.2  74.2  72.8  18.9 
Georgia  2.1  1.6  67.3  68.3  75.0  75.2  18.7 
Kazakhstan  2.8  2.3  63.9  59.2  73.1  71.5  15.5 
Kyrgyzstan  3.8  2.5  64.3  64.5  72.4  71.9  17.1 
Tajikistan  5.1  3.4  66.7  64.5  71.8  69.7  18.6 
Turkmenistan  4.3  2.4  61.8  61.1  68.4  69.2  16.7 
Uzbekistan  4.1  2.2  66.0  62.8  72.1  71.2  18.3 
Source: data for 1989 from UNICEF Transmonee database 2009; data for 2009 from ILO 
(2010). 
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Stable or rising mortality 
The most fundamental measure of the well being of a population is how long its members 
can expect to live on average. The negative impact of the transition process on the well 
being of the population is reflected in the decline in life expectancy at birth for both 
women and men in a number of countries.  With the exception of Tajikistan, where the 
country was affected by armed conflict for much of the period 1992 1997, the 
deterioration in life expectancy was most marked in Kazakhstan where male life 
expectancy fell by a staggering 5.9 years, from 63.9 in 1989 to a low of 58.0 in 1996 
(Falkingham, 2000). Since then there has been some recovery, but even in 2009 male life 
expectancy at birth in Kazakhstan remained relatively low at under 60. Similar patterns 
were also observed in Russia and parts of Central and Eastern Europe (McKee, 1998).  
 
Today life expectancy at birth is significantly higher for both men and women in the 
South Caucasus than in Central Asia, with the best performer being Armenia (70.6 years 
for men and 77.1 years for women in 2009). The lowest levels of life expectancy at birth 
for women are observed in Turkmenistan (69.2 years), whilst Kazakhstan remains the 
worst performer for men. 
 
Life expectancy at birth is influenced by mortality rates across all ages. Table 1 also 
shows the latest estimates of life expectancy at age 60 for the countries in the region. This 
is of central relevance for pension systems as it illustrates how long a person who starts 
drawing a pension at age 60 may be expected, on average, to receive pension benefits. 
The ranking of countries according to this measure is somewhat different to that using 
life expectancy at birth as it excludes the effect of both infant and maternal mortality. 
Interestingly, someone who has survived to age 60 in Tajikistan will be expected to live, 
on average, a further 18.6 years whilst a 60 year old in Armenia may expect to live a 
further 19.5 years.  
 
Outward migration 
The early 1990s were marked by significant out migration of people from Central Asia 
and the Caucasus as well as movement between the countries of the region (Table 2). For   13 
example, it is estimated that during the period 1990 2000 Kazakhstan experienced net out 
migration of over 1.5 million people, of which nearly a million was net migration to 
Russia and 850,000 to outside the FSU. At the same time Kazkhstan experienced a net 
inflow from other republics in the FSU, notably from the other Central Asia republics. 
Many of the first wave of migrants were ethnic Russians who ‘returned’ to Russia in the 
early 1990s. However, since the mid 1990s there has been a considerable flow of 
migrants workers (Mansoor and Quillin, 2007).  
 
Table 2: Net migration by destination during the 1990s, Central Asia and the South 
Caucasus 
  Total  Russia  Other 
FSU 
Non 
FSU 
Armenia 1990 2001   60.4   125.6  97.5   32.3 
Azerbaijan 1990 2003   284.6   252.9  1.3   33 
Georgia 1990 1992     85.2   24.4   
Kazakhstan 1990 2000   1581.1   957.6  227.6   851.1 
Kyrgyzstan 1990 1996   392.1   278.8   8.2   105.1 
Tajikistan 1990 1995   357.1   258.3   64   34.8 
Turkmenistan 1990 1995   52.4   51.2  0.1   1.3 
Uzbekistan 1990 1998   728.3   542.8   46   139.5 
Source: Table 1.1.6 Mansoor and Quillin (2007) 
 
For all the countries in the region Russia has been the dominant destination, and the 
majority of migratory moves have been within the countries of the FSU. In the early 
1990s there were large migrations of ethnic Germans from both Kazakhstan and the 
Kyrgyz Republic to Germany, the presence of whom in the region was the result of both 
voluntary and forced migrations of Germans to Central Asia during the Soviet period. 
Over 800,000 Germans left from Kazakhstan and nearly 100,000 from Kyrgyzstan in the 
period 1992 1995 as the German government granted citizenship to anyone with proof of 
German ancestry
3. The United States has been the primary destination outside the FSU 
for migrants from Armenia, with most of these joining the already large Armenian 
diaspora community there, while Israel has been a top Azerbaijani destination (Mansoor 
and Quillin, 2007). It should also be noted that these figures provide a lower estimate of 
                                                 
3 This liberal policy has since been reformed with the introduction of tighter immigration criteria following 
the difficulties of integrating relatively large numbers of Russian speaking Germans experienced in the 
early 1990s.   14 
the true migratory flows in the region, with the figures only capturing a fraction of a 
much larger undocumented and circular migration from all the countries to Russia. The 
figures also do not reflect the significant number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 
some of the countries because of past or on going conflicts. 
 
One consequence of the high levels of migration has been the growth in remittances as a 
share of GDP in the region. In 2004, remittances from migrants represented over 
20 percent of GDP in Moldova and over 10 percent in Armenia, and Tajikistan. By 2008, 
Tajikistan topped the global legal table with remittances estimated to contribute a 
staggering 45.5% of GDP, with Moldova in second place at 38.3% (Ratha, Mohapatra 
and Xu, 2008). 
 
An ageing population 
One consequence of the decline in fertility along with the relatively high levels of 
survivorship will be a significant shift in the age composition of the population over the 
next three decades (Figure 2). In ‘low fertility’ Georgia, the proportion of the population 
aged 60 and over was already 19 percent in 2010; by 2030 this is projected to rise to 27 
percent and by 2050 nearly a third (32%) of the population of Georgia will be aged over 
60. This contrasts with the situation in ‘high fertility’ Tajikistan, where in 2010 just 5 
percent of the population were aged over 60. However even here it is projected that 
individuals aged 60 and over will account for nearly 16 percent of Tajikistan’s population 
by 2050.   15 
Fig 2: Percentage of the population aged 60 and over
Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2010-2050
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Source: UN (2009) World Population Prospects. The 2008 Revision 
 
Socio-economic trends 
 
At independence all of the newly formed republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus 
inherited high levels of human capital. Education and health care were free and there 
were extensive social services and transfers. They also, however, inherited economic 
structures that were heavily dependent on Soviet supply and trade networks. Russia was 
the main source of inputs and the main market for outputs. Transport and other 
infrastructure were designed with the view to meeting these needs and not necessarily 
those of the local economy. High social spending was supported by large budgetary 
transfers from Moscow. It is estimated that in the late 1980s/early 1990s such transfers 
were worth between 12 percent of GDP in Kazakhstan to as much as 40 percent of GDP 
in Tajikistan. 
 
As highlighted in Figure 1 above, the transition to independence was accompanied by a 
severe economic dislocation in all countries in the region as the complex inter dependent 
production and trade networks of the Soviet Union were dismantled. Real wages fell, 
joblessness increased, school enrolment dropped and general health deteriorated   16 
(Falkingham, 2000; 2005).The dramatic declines in GDP affected all sections of the 
population and the proportion of the population living in poverty rose sharply. 
 
Rising poverty 
Even before independence, the Soviet Republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus were 
amongst the poorest of the USSR. Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) using a threshold of 
75 rubles as the national ‘poverty’ line, estimated that around 31million people, or 11 
percent of the total population of the USSR, were poor by this standard. The proportion 
living in poverty however varied considerably across the Republics, with over half of 
those living in Tajikistan having a per capita income of less than 75 rubles compared to 
just 2 percent in Estonia. Since households in Central Asia tend to be bigger than in the 
European republics, per capita income may tend to exaggerate differences in living 
standards between the republics. At the same time differences in prices across the 
republics are ignored by the single cut off measure of 75 roubles and prices were higher, 
on average, in Central Asia than in many of the other republics which would imply that 
living standards were overestimated in the region (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992). 
Whatever the case, it appears from Table 3 that it would be untrue to say that poverty was 
unknown in Central Asia and the Caucasus before the transition. 
 
Table 3: The proportion of the population of Central Asia and the south Caucasus 
living in poverty, 1989 to mid 2000s 
  (1) 
Percent of population 
with per capita monthly 
income 
below 75 Rbs, 1989 
  (2) 
Percent of population 
living below $2.15 
PPP 
(mid late 1990s) 
  (3) 
Percent of population 
living below $2.15 
PPP 
(latest year) 
    Year    Year   
Armenia  14.3  1998  58  2003  43.3 
Azerbaijan  33.6      2005  2.0 
Georgia  13.0  1997  45  2005  30.4 
Kazakhstan  15.5  2001  31  2003  17.2 
Kyrgyzstan  32.9  2000  78  2004  51.9 
Tajikistan  51.2  1999  91  2004  50.8 
Turkmenistan  35.0      1998  49.6 
Uzbekistan  43.6      2003  76.7 
Source: Column (1) from Table 8.4, Atkinson and Micklewright (1992); Column (2) from 
Table 1, Alam et al (2005); Column (3) from ILO (2009). 
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The transition to a market economy may not have originated poverty in the region, but it 
certainly exacerbated the existing disadvantage of the ‘old poor’ (pensioners, families 
with large numbers of children and single parent families), and gave rise to new groups of 
poor such as the families of workers ‘on leave without pay’, the long term unemployed, 
agricultural workers, young people in search of their first job, and a growing number of 
refugees, both economic refugees and persons displaced as a result of civil conflict 
(Falkingham, 2000). By the mid late 1990s over half the population of Armenia (58%) 
and three quarters of the population of Kyrgyzstan (78%) were estimated to be living on 
less than $2.15 PPP, whilst in Tajikistan over nine in every ten people (91%) were poor 
by this standard (Table 3). With positive economic growth returning in the late 1990s, 
poverty rates have fallen somewhat, but remain an issue for concern in many countries. 
The data for the latest year available show that in 2004 over half the population in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain living in poverty, with rates lowest in oil rich 
Azerbaijan (just 2%) and highest in slow reforming Uzbekistan (77%). 
 
Widening inequality 
The rise in poverty has been accompanied by a widening in inequality in both wages and 
income. In the Soviet Union the overall distribution of income was much more egalitarian 
than in most market economies (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992; Milanovic, 1998). 
This was due to both the higher level of social expenditure – social transfers made up 14 
percent of total gross income (USSR, 1988 Family Budget Survey) – and lower wage 
differentials. Over 96 percent of the work force were employed by state owned 
enterprises (including kolkhozes). Thus, virtually all income, either transfers or wages, 
was received through the intermediation of the State. 
 
The restructuring of economic activity and greater private sector income, along with the 
privatisation of state assets and redistribution of wealth and the growth of open 
unemployment, have resulted in a growing gap between the income of the rich and poor 
(Falkingham, 2005). Figure 3 highlights the rapid growth in income inequality in all the 
countries in the region. To put these figures into context, the Gini coefficient for India in 
2005 was estimated to be 0.325.   18 
 
Figure 3: Gini coefficient 1989-mid 2000s, 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus
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Source: Data for 1989 from Table UI3, Atkinson and Micklewright (1992). Data for 
latest year (see Table 1 for year) from ILO (2009). 
 
Falling labour force participation and growing unemployment 
Within the Soviet Union there was officially full employment and open unemployment 
was unknown. Economic restructuring and the transition from public to private 
ownership of many enterprises led to many firms laying off formerly underemployed 
workers as keeping an artificially inflated workforce on the wage bill became too 
expensive. Consistent data on unemployment levels remains hard to find in the region as 
official data on registered unemployment undercounts the true extent of unemployment; 
only those workers who qualify for unemployment benefit have an incentive to register 
and in many countries the qualifying criteria as so tight as to exclude the vast majority of 
individuals.  
 
Table 4 below shows unemployment as a percent of the labour force for both men and 
women over the period 1995 2005. It is notable that unemployment rates are highest in 
Georgia where there have been several ILO sponsored labour force surveys (and thus 
reasonable data) and lowest in Uzbekistan where the data rely on officially reported 
estimates. In most countries in the region, unemployment rose significantly during the   19 
early mid 1990s, reaching a peak in the late 1990s following the Russian fiscal crisis and 
has contracted somewhat since then as countries moved back into positive economic 
growth. For those countries with reliable survey data (Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan) rates remain high at between 7 14%. In all countries, with the exception of 
Georgia, unemployment rates are higher amongst women than men (Figure 4). In part 
this reflects the gendered nature of employment during the Soviet period, with women 
being concentrated in the government sector, particularly health and education both of 
which have suffered large job losses.  
 
Table 4: Unemployment as a percentage of the labour force (both sexes) in the 
countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, 1995-2005 
  1995  2000  2005 
Armenia  6.7  11.7  8.2 
Azerbaijan  0.8  1.2  1.4 
Georgia    10.8  13.8 
Kazakhstan  10.4  8.1  6.6 
Kyrgyzstan    12.5  8.1 
Tajikistan  2.0  2.7  2.0 
Uzbekistan  0.4  0.4  0.3 
Source: Table 10, ILO (2010) 
 
Figure 4: Unemployed as a percentage of the labour force, 
by gender, 1995-2005
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Source: Table 10, ILO (2010) 
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Historically labour force participation rates for women were very high, especially in 
comparison with other Asian societies. The Soviet system provided for free child care at 
most enterprises and there was an extensive network of subsidised kindergarten. Women 
were expected to work and gender differentials were relatively narrow. Over time labour 
force participation rates amongst both men and women have fallen, but the decline has 
been sharper for women, with the result that there are now significant differences 
between men and women in all countries, with male labour force participation rates being 
10 20 percent higher than those amongst females (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Labour force participation rates in the countries of Central Asia and the 
South Caucasus, 2010 
  15 64  65 and over 
  Male  Female  Male  Female 
Armenia  82.8  69.2  15.6  8.5 
Azerbaijan  71.2  65.1  10.8  9.4 
Georgia  78.0  59.4  50.9  37.7 
Kazakhstan  80.7  73.3  13.9  9.7 
Kyrgyzstan  83.3  59.2  18.8  7.1 
Tajikistan  81.6  60.6  15.9  5.8 
Turkmenistan  77.6  66.9  8.2  5.0 
Uzbekistan  74.5  62.4  18.9  10.9 
Source: ILO (2009) Economically Active Population Estimates and Projection 1980 
2020. 
 
In 2010, labour force participation rates for men aged 15 64 varied from a low of 71 
percent in Azerbaijan to a high of 83 percent in Kyrgyzstan whilst for women of the same 
age they ranged from 59 in Kyrgyzstan to 73 in neighbouring Kazakhstan. Interestingly, 
participation rates remain relatively high amongst both men and women aged 65 and 
over. This is especially the case in Georgia where 51 percent of men and 38 percent of 
women aged 65 and over are still in the labour force.   
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IV. Trends in pension provision in Central Asia and the South 
Caucasus, 1990s to 2000s  
 
As discussed in Section II, all the countries of the FSU enjoyed close to universal 
coverage during the 1980s. Section III has highlighted that the economic dislocation of 
the early 1990s, along with privatisation and enterprise restructuring led to the emergence 
of open unemployment, widening gender differentials in labour force participation rates 
and rising inequality. As well as increasing the demands on the social protection system 
through rising poverty, the economic restructuring also had significant consequences for 
the pension systems in the region. This section examines the key trends in pension 
provision in Central Asia and the south Caucasus during the last two decades. 
 
Declining coverage and shrinking contribution base 
Pension system coverage during the Soviet period was virtually universal. The economic 
restructuring of the 1990s resulted in a dramatic decline in both the number of 
contributors and the level of contributions collected. Tables 4 and 5 in section III above 
have highlighted the drop in labour force participation rates and the rise in 
unemployment; both of these trends have reduced the number of contributors. This has 
been exacerbated by significant out migration of younger workers in some countries, 
further reducing the domestic labour force. The change in the structure of employment, 
with a move away from large state enterprises to small private firms, increasing levels of 
self employment and employment in the informal sector has been accompanied by 
widespread tax evasion (IMF, 2001; World Bank, 2001), affecting both contributors and 
contributions.  Although the majority of Central Asian states still have relatively 
‘youthful’ populations due to historically high fertility rates, it is important to note that 
pension system dependency rates are relatively high – reflecting the low proportion of the 
working age population who are currently contributing to the state Pension Fund. 
 
Table 6 shows the percentage of the working age population who are active contributors 
to the state pension system along with the percentage of the population above the legal 
retirement age who are in receipt of a pension. In contrast to the virtual complete   22 
coverage of the working age population in the Soviet period, even by the mid 1990s 
coverage had fallen sharply, with rates of just 42 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 44 percent in 
Kazakhstan and 49.4% in Armenia. Only in Georgia did coverage of the working age 
population remain reasonably high (72%). By the middle of the last decade, coverage had 
fallen even further to under a quarter of the working age population in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia and under a third in Kyrgyzstan. However, coverage rates 
improved between the mid 1900s and 2000s in Kazakhstan. The reasons for this are 
discussed further in the case study in Section V below. 
 
Table 6: Active contributors and older people in receipt of state pensions in the 
countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, mid 1990s-mid 2000s 
  % working age population who are active 
contributors 
% of pop above legal retirement age 
in receipt of pension 
  Year    Year    Year   
Armenia  1995  49.4  2004  24.5  2006  93.1 
Azerbaijan  1996  46.0  2003  23.0  2003  97.9 
Georgia  1996  72.0  2004  22.7     
Kazakhstan  1997  44.0  2003  61.8  2004  76.0 
Kyrgyzstan  1997  42.0  2006  28.9  2005  100.0 
Tajikistan          2004  89.6 
Uzbekistan  1995  15.0      2005  100.0 
 Source: data for 1990s from Table 4.15 Palacios and Pallarès Miralles (2000); data for 
mid 2000s from Table 21 ILO (2010) 
 
Despite a contraction in the contributory base, the proportion of the population over the 
legal retirement age in receipt of a pension has remained high. In the mid 2000s, over 
nine in ten potentially eligible older people were in receipt of a state pension in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan and 100% in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Only in Kazakhstan were old 
age benefit recipient rates relatively low (76%) and even here they are high compared to 
other countries in Asia. 
 
Falling public pension expenditure 
During the first years of independence, with increasing numbers of beneficiaries and 
falling contributors, the system dependency ratios in the region reached very high levels 
by international standards. In order to cope with the increasing financial pressure, 
countries introduced steps to contain the rise in spending in a number of different ways. 
Georgia was one of the first countries to raise the statutory retirement age, introducing   23 
legislation in 1995. As already mentioned, the Kyrgyz government introduced measures 
to reduce the number of special privileges to try and reduce early retirement. In 
Kazakhstan and elsewhere, pension benefits were not up rated in line with prices. 
Incomplete indexation led to a fall in the real value of benefits, keeping the growth rate of 
average pensions below the rate of growth in nominal GDP.  Finally, growth in pension 
expenditure was constrained by the accumulation of significant arrears. In the mid 1990s, 
as shown in Table 7, spending on public pensions as a share of GDP ranged from just 1.7 
percent in Georgia in 1996 (reflecting in part the rise in retirement age which came into 
effect the year before) to 6.4 percent in Kyrgyzstan. These levels are significantly lower 
than those observed in parts of Central and Eastern Europe during the same time period; 
spending on public pensions reached 14.4 percent of GDP in Poland in 1995, 13.6 
percent in Slovenia and 10.2 percent in Latvia, primarily as a result of the Government 
trying to maintain replacement rates (Palacios and Pallarès Miralles, 2000).  
 
Table 7: Public pension spending as a percentage of GDP in the countries of Central 
Asia and the South Caucasus, mid 1990s-mid 2000s 
  Year    Year   
Armenia  1996  3.1  2004  2.4 
Azerbaijan  1996  2.5  2003  2.7 
Georgia  1996  1.7     
Kazakhstan  1997  5.0  2004  2.9 
Kyrgyzstan  1997  6.4  2005  4.8 
Tajikistan  1996  3.0     
Turkmenistan  1996  2.3     
Uzbekistan  1995  5.3  2005  6.2 
Source: data for 1990s from Table 4.16 Palacios and Pallarès Miralles (2000); data for 
mid 2000s from Table 26 ILO (2010) 
 
The reforms introduced in the region since the mid 1990s have acted to further constrain 
public spending. In 2004/5, public pension spending as a share of GDP had actually 
fallen even further in Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whilst in Uzbekistan, where 
reform has been slow spending rose to account for 6.2 percent of GDP – a level still not 
high by international standards.   
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Rising contribution rates 
One response to high system dependency ratios has been to increase contribution rates. In 
the initial stages, the cost was largely borne by employers with employee contributions 
remaining either low or non existent. By the mid 1990s, employer contribution were 
around a third of the gross wage bill in Armenia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan (Table 8). In 
the countries where pension reform has been most advanced, there has been a rebalancing 
between employer and employee contributions.  In Kyrgyzstan, employee contribution 
increased to 8 percent, whilst Kazakhstan went further and abolished employers 
contributions altogether   relying on a 10 percent employee contribution to an 
individually based fund (see Section V below). 
 
Table 8: Pension contribution rates as percentage of gross wage in the countries of 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus, mid 1990s-mid 2000s 
  Mid 1990s  Mid 2000s 
  Employer  Employee  Employer  Employee 
Armenia  35.0  1.0  Flat rate  3.0 
Azerbaijan      22.0  3.0 
Georgia  37.0  1.0     
Kazakhstan         10.0 
Kyrgyzstan  33.0  2.5  21.0  8.0 
Turkmenistan      20.0  1.0 
Uzbekistan      31.0  2.5 
Source: data for 1990s from Table 4.18 Palacios and Pallarès Miralles (2000); data for 
mid 2000s from Table 16 ILO (2010) 
 
Increasing retirement ages 
As already highlighted, another response to increasing system dependency ratios was to 
increase retirement ages. Normal retirement ages within the Soviet pension system (60 
for men and 55 for women) were low by international standards and the numerous 
opportunities for early retirement meant that the effective average age of retirement was 
even lower. Moreover people could continue in paid employment whilst drawing a 
pension. Given the relatively high life expectancy at 60 shown in Table 1 above, the low 
retirement ages meant that many pensions were payable for 20 25 years. 
 
Since 1991 all the countries in the region, with the exception of Uzbekistan, have 
introduced reforms raising the age at which people are entitled to a public pension and   25 
tightening the circumstances under which exceptions are allowed. Some countries have 
gone further than others. For example, in Georgia the retirement age has been raised by 
five years to 65 for men and 60 for women and there are now no special circumstances 
allowing early retirement. Moreover pensioners above retirement age who are in gainful 
employment must satisfy an earnings test
4. However in Azerbaijan extensive elements of 
the old Soviet system remain; for example, an early pension is payable at age 57 for men 
(52 for women) with at least 25 years (20 for women) including at least 12.6 years (10 for 
women) work in unhealthy or arduous conditions. An early pension is also provided for 
mothers who have raised at least three children or one disabled child from birth to age 8.   
 
Interestingly, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the award of Hero Mother 
was withdrawn in most countries. For example, it was discontinued in Tajikistan in 1996 
as part of an effort to reduce fertility. However there have been campaigns to bring it 
back in some states
5. In Kazakhstan, mothers of 10 or more children have since 1995 
been awarded the Altyn Alka (Алтын алка, "Golden pendant") and mothers of eight or 
nine children have received the Kumis Alka (Кумiс алка, "Silver pendant"). 
 
Table 9: Qualifying age for public old age and social pensions in the countries of 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus, 2008 
  Old Age Pension  Social Pension 
  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Armenia  63  61.5 (raised to 63 
in 2011) 
65  65 
Azerbaijan  62  57  67  62 
Georgia  65  60  70  65 
Kazakhstan  63  58  63  58 
Kyrgyzstan  63  58  63  58 
Tajikistan         
Turkmenistan  62  57  62  57 
Uzbekistan  60  55  60  55 
Source: SSPTW, Asia and the Pacific, 2008 
 
In all the countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), the 
qualifying age for the social pension is several years higher than that for the old age 
                                                 
4 Given this, it is interesting to note the high rates of labour force participation in Georgia at ages 65 and 
above in Table 5. 
5 For example, the award was restored in Ukraine in 2004.   26 
pension, whilst in Central Asia there is no distinction in the age at which either pension 
may be drawn (Table 9). The qualifying conditions for a social pension also vary. In 
Armenia social (old age) pensions are paid to men and women at age 65 with less than 5 
years covered employment. In Azerbaijan it is payable to non working citizens who are 
not eligible for the old age pension. Although there is a work test, there is no means test, 
whilst in Georgia the social pension is paid to an individual ‘without other means of 
support’ implying that the benefit is means tested. In contrast in Kyrgyzstan, the social 
assistance allowance (old age) is paid to all persons not eligible for an old age pension 
and there is no work or income test.   
 
Declining replacement rates, falling benefit levels 
Benefit replacement rates during the Soviet period were high, with most people retiring 
on a pension two thirds or higher of their average best earnings. Replacement rates were 
an early casualty of the declining tax base immediately following independence. Limited 
comparative historical information is available but as Table 10 shows for those countries 
where there are data for the mid 1990s, the average values of old age pensions were 
around a quarter to a third of the average wage.  
 
Table 10: Replacement rates of public pensions in the countries of Central Asia and 
the South Caucasus in the mid 1990s (average pension as a share of average wage) 
  Year  Average 
Replacement Rate 
(%) 
Armenia  1996  24.0 
Azerbaijan  1996  29.0 
Georgia  1996  36.0 
Kazakhstan  1996  31.0 
Source: Table 4.19a Palacios and Pallarès Miralles (2000) 
 
Today the level of public pensions is still a matter of concern, with newspaper articles 
frequently highlighting the fact that pensions on their own do not afford older people an 
adequate standard of living. In Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the social 
pension is paid at a level below the minimum old age pension, meaning that the most 
vulnerable older people are exposed. 
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Table 11: Value in national currency of old age and social pensions in the countries 
of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, 2008 
  Minimum (or 
base) old age 
pension 
Social pension  Monthly 
minimum wage 
Armenia  6,800 drams  6,800 drams   
Azerbaijan  75 new manat  45 new manat  60 new manta 
Georgia  70 lari  70 lari   
Kazakhstan  7,900 tengi    13,183 tenge 
Kyrgyzstan  530 soms  200 soms   
Tajikistan       
Turkmenistan  550,000 manat  550,000 manat   
Uzbekistan  50% min wage    18,630 soms 
Source: SSPTW, Asia and the Pacific, 2008 
 
Reforming pension systems: moving away from PAYG 
Given falling contributions and constrained government expenditure, several countries in 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus have reformed the funding basis of their pension 
system. The majority of countries in the region continue to provide retirees with some 
percentage of their former salary per year of contribution. In Georgia and Tajikistan, 
where pension fund revenues are very low, benefits are the same for the majority of 
people and there is now very little differentiation according to past salaries. Kyrgyzstan 
has adopted a variant of a PAYG system called ‘notional accounts’ in which each 
contribution made by individual workers is tracked in an individual account with a 
hypothetical interest credits to contributions. At retirement the balance in this notional 
account is converted into a pension. However benefits are still paid out of current 
contributions and hence the system retains its PAYG element. At present only 
Kazakhstan has moved away from a PAYG funding basis. Workers’ contributions are 
credited to individual savings accounts and invested in a range of financial assets rather 
than being used to fund current pension obligations. The contributions plus interest 
earned on each account will be used to provide a pension when the first wave of 
contributors retire.  
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Box 1: Types of Pension Schemes in Central Asia and the South Caucasus 
Conventional PAYG 
Today’s contribution fund today’s 
benefits 
Pension based on a defined benefit 
Armenia (to 2011), Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Notional accounts 
Today’s contribution fund today’s 
benefits 
Pension based on a defined contribution 
Kyrgyzstan 
Fully funded 
Individual’s contribution fund 
individual’s benefits 
Pension based on a defined contribution 
Kazakhstan 
Armenia (from 2011) 
 
 
V. Case studies  
All the countries in the region have either undertaken or are in the process of planning 
pension reform. This section draws on four case studies to examine the impact of the 
reforms, drawing out the implications for the well being of older people of moving away 
from the Soviet old age pension system.  The four case studies chosen represent 
differences in both the timing and extent of reforms. Kyrgyzstan was an early reformer, 
adopting notional accounts in 1997. Although in theory the reform looked radical in 
setting up individual accounts, in practice the reforms introduced were quite modest in 
nature and a minimum contributory pension still linked to employment remains. 
Kazakhstan also reformed its system in the mid 1990s, but in comparison with 
Kyrgyzstan its reforms were much more radical in nature, abandoning the old PAYG 
Soviet system with defined benefits and switching to a fully funded defined contribution 
system. The first wave of reforms in Armenia took place somewhat later than the two 
Central Asian republics but the country is now in the process of adopting a second wave 
of legislation, with a proposed move to a fully funded model from 2011. Finally pension 
reform is only now been discussed in Tajikistan. The system remains largely unchanged   29 
except for some minor changes to eligibility for special privileges. Benefits have only 
been up rated periodically with the result that the real value of benefits has fallen, raising 
the question of whether the system now provides adequate income security and the 
relative role of family/community support networks versus the state in maintaining well 
being in later life. In discussing the reforms particular attention is paid to the issues of 
universality and minimum income guarantee and the effects on people’s well being. 
 
Kazakhstan 
As discussed in general above, when Kazakhstan declared its independence from the 
former Soviet Union in 1991, the country saw deteriorating economic conditions, which 
directly impacted on the living conditions of the population for the best part of the 1990s 
(Becker and Urzhumova, 1998). For example, in 1992, consumer price inflation exceeded 
3,000% and the country’s GDP fell by 11.3% (Seitenova and Becker, 2004). Between 
1994 and 1997, the Pension Fund deficit increased from 12% to 53% of the country’s 
GDP, while the rapid increase of unemployment meant that by 1998 there were 83 
pensioners and other benefit recipients for every 100 contributors (Seitenova and Becker, 
2004, Fig 1 and 4).  
 
The declining performance of the pension system resulted in June 1997 in the emergency 
introduction of the “Law on Pension Provision in the Republic of Kazakhstan”, which 
transformed the PAYG system to a fully funded, defined contribution system. All 
accruals under the old system were frozen and workers of all ages were moved 
immediately into a new system of mandatory individual accounts. Retirement ages were 
raised from their Soviet era levels from 60 to 63 for men and from 55 to 58 for women. 
During a transitional period, a residual PAYG pillar remains, paying benefits to existing 
pensioners and people with accrued rights under the pre reform system entering 
retirement up to around 2038 (40 years from the reform). This is funded through a tax on 
employers. This was initially set at 15 percent with the expectation that it would be   30 
gradually reduced over time as existing obligations decreased 
6. For future pensioners, 
from 1998 onwards a new mandatory, defined contribution scheme was introduced, 
funded through 10% of the employees’ wages. All workers are mandated to join the new 
scheme. During the transition period, retirees will receive benefits from the old PAYG 
pillar based on the number of years of contributions and also receive benefits from the 
new funded pillar for the relatively small percentage of their working career during which 
they contributed to the new funded scheme. 
 
The transition to a fully funded, defined contribution pension system aimed, on the one 
hand, to provide social protection to the majority of the working population through a 
sustainable mechanism, and to facilitate the growth of the capital market through the 
management of pension investments. For example, the World Bank projected that 
between 2004 and 2025, the country’s pension expenditure would increase from 5% to 
6% (Chawla, M. et al, 2007, Fig. 4.6). In addition to encouraging the wide participation 
of employees, the government of Kazakhstan was assisted by the Asian Development 
Bank in developing more reliable mechanisms for the collection of contributions and 
tackling significant institutional obstacles to the transition to the new pension system, 
such as the computerization of social insurance records for the country’s millions of 
contributors. Finally, the transition was supported by significant investment in public 
information campaigns on the new pension system by the Asian Development Bank, the 
United States Agency for International Development and the World Bank (Andrews, 
2001). 
 
There are some encouraging signs regarding the ‘success’ of the Kazakh pension reforms. 
In contrast to other countries in the region, Table 6 above shows that coverage rates in 
terms of the working age population who are contributing to the state pension scheme 
have increased, from 44% in 1997 to 62% in 2003 – the highest rate in the region.  
However the picture in terms of coverage of older people i.e. proportion receiving a 
benefit, is less optimistic. Only, three quarters of the population aged above pension age 
                                                 
6 The Social Insurance tax was actually raised to 26% in 1999 and then reduced to 21% in July 2001. This 
rate was maintained until January 2004 when a new social tax was introduced, ranging from 13% to 5%. In 
2009 a single social tax rate of 11% of payroll was introduced. (Seitenova and O’Brien, 2010).   31 
were in receipt of a pension in 2004. However the introduction of a ‘demogrant’ or 
‘citizens pension’ in 2005 is expected to have boosted this number. 
 
The initial reforms enacted in 1998 included no minimum guarantee or floor regarding 
the level of retirement income a worker could expect to attain from their new individual 
account. This was in contrast to Chile, where return guarantees and minimum annuity 
levels were built into the system from the start. However, in June 2005 the President of 
Kazakhstan signed in law a number of revisions including provision for a citizen’s 
pension that is to be provided to all persons reaching retirement age regardless of work 
history or contributions to the pension system. When introduced, the level of the new 
basic pension was set at 3,000 tenge per month, equivalent to around 40 percent of 
subsistence minimum, with a target of being increased to 75% of the subsistence 
minimum in the future (Hinz, Zviniene and Vilamovska, 2005). However as of March 
2010, the citizen’s pension remained payable at 40% of the subsistence minimum 
(Seitenova and O’Brien, 2010). 
  
Although there is little doubt that the PAYG system before the 1997 reform was 
unsustainable, the transition to a fully funded defined contribution system should be 
regarded with due caution. In particular it is far from clear than the 10% contribution rate 
will yield sufficient funds to purchase a pension that will provide an adequate standard of 
living or maintain replacement rates. According to estimates by the World Bank, 
additional voluntary contributions and intra family transfers will be required in order to 
reach the intended replacement rate of 60% of prior earnings, which was the 
government’s initial target with the reform (Andrews, 2001).  
 
The move from a defined benefit to a defined contribution system means that workers 
with interrupted employment histories or low lifetime earnings, many of whom are 
women, risk facing vulnerability in later life as the ‘insurance’ element of the pension 
system has been removed. In addition, the 5 year gap in retirement ages can further 
exacerbate women’s disadvantageous position well into later life. Although the new 
citizens pension introduced in 2005 should provide a safety net there are issues over its   32 
adequacy and there is a risk that people with an entitlement to a low DC pension may 
find themselves excluded –the so called ‘private pensions trap’.   
 
Ultimately pension returns will be determined by the rate of return to pension assets, and 
the new pension system in theory allows for additional voluntary contributions on top of 
first  and second tier pension protection; however the implications for gender inequity 
should not be underestimated. 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
Following independence, Kyrgyzstan experienced similar budgetary problems to its 
neighbouring states. Discussions regarding the reform of the pension system began as 
early as 1994, with the country receiving significant international technical assistance 
under an EUTACIS grant and support from the World Bank. In 1996 7 Kyrgyzstan 
adopted two major laws reforming the pension system, raising the retirement age and 
introducing notional accounts, whilst maintaining a minimum contributory based 
pension.  
 
Under the new system the individual pension is divided into two parts: a base pension 
and an insured pension. The base pension is a flat rate benefit paid to all retirees with 
complete contribution histories (25/20 years for men/women), with the level guaranteed 
and set by the government. The insured pension is then paid on top of the base pension 
and in theory is calculated as the amount accumulated in the individual’s ‘notional 
account’ multiplied by an actuarial coefficient. This coefficient is set annually by the 
government and reflects the age of retirement and average life expectancy at that age. 
Notional accounts, however, require individual record keeping, a system of which has 
only been introduced relatively recently. Thus prior to the establishment of the individual 
record keeping system, the insured part of the pension is calculated as 1% times the 
number of years of service multiplied by the monthly wage, with a cap of 15 times the 
minimum wage. 
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The reforms have had limited success in reducing the pension fund deficit. Unlike in 
Kazakhstan where employer contributions were reduced to 15% to pay for the transitional 
pillar and with employees bearing entire the burden of a 10% contribution rate, in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2004 the contribution rate to the State Pension Fund was 29%, with 21% 
paid by the employer (3% to base and 18% to notional account) and 8% by employee 
(3% to base and 5% to notional account) (Becker, Seitenova and Urzhumova, 2005). The 
high tax burden on employers has exacerbated already pervasive tax evasion, and as a 
result coverage has fallen.  In 1997 42% of working age population were estimated to be 
contributing; by 2006 this had fallen to just 29% (Table 6 above). 
 
Table 12 Percentage of households with persons of normal pension age, average 
amount of pension, Kyrgyzstan 2008. 
Kyrgyzstan  %  % receiving a 
pension 
Average 
amount of 
pension 
HH with No pensioner  75.0  23.0  11713 
HH with 1 pensioner  18.7  100.0  16945 
HH with 2 pensioners  5.3  100.0  30603 
HH with 3 pensioners  0.0  100.0  54989 
       
Source: Authors’ own analysis Kyrgyzstan HBS 2008. 
Note: total number of households = 4995, per capita average pension per household with 
a pensioner 16597. 
 
The first pillar guaranteed contributory minimum pension is supported by a zero pillar 
social pension. Together these mean that according to ILO estimates presented in Table 6 
above,100 percent of older people are in receipt of pension – either old age or social 
pension. This finding is supported by the authors own recent analysis of the 2008 
Kyrgyzstan Household Budget Survey, conducted in 2008. The results in Table 12 are 
presented according to the number of people of normal pension age in the household. 
Interestingly three quarters of all Kyrgyz households do not contain a person over 
‘retirement age’, yet nearly a quarter (23%) of such households reported being in receipt 
of income from an old age pension – reflecting the continuing persistence of early 
retirement of some categories of workers. All households containing a person of pension 
age report being in receipt of income from a pension and the average income from this 
source rises according to the number of pensioners. Overall, the average per capita   34 
pension per household with a pensioner was 16,597 per year. In 2008, the $2.15 PPP was 
equivalent to 1,036 soms a month or 12,604 a year. Thus the average pension is just 
sufficient to lift an older person out of poverty.  
 
Armenia 
Armenia has been slower to implement reform than its two Central Asian colleagues. 
Although there have been increases in the pension age to 63, the pension system remains 
funded on a PAYG  basis with the pension formula based on length of service but not 
salary levels
7. Benefits have been adjusted on an ad hoc basis according to available 
resources. In recognition of the low value of the pensions, the Government increased all 
pensions by 60% on 1
st January 2008 and introduced an annual schedule of increases 
such that the average pension would reach the level  of the minimum consumption basket 
by 2012 (USAID, 2009).  
 
As is the case elsewhere, the pension system has come under pressure from a declining 
revenue base. According to ILO estimates, in 1995 just under half (49%) of the working 
age population was contributing to the pension scheme. By 2004, this had fallen to under 
a quarter (24.5%) (Table 6 above). Research carried out by the GoA in conjunction with 
USAID as part of the Pension Working Group estimates that only 32% of the 
economically active population makes social contributions. Three key groups are 
excluded. First, the agricultural sector which accounts for around half of the 
economically active population are not required by law to contribute to the social security 
system. This means that a significant proportion of workers are no longer accruing 
service and over time an increasing number will receive only a social pension. Second, 
there is  a growing informal sector whose workers are not covered. Finally, migrant 
workers are also not accruing service; it is estimated that around a fifth of all Armenian 
households have at least one member involved in migrant labour (USAID, 2009). This 
drop in coverage presents a challenge both for the current pension system in terms of its 
revenue base and also for the future welfare of these workers in their retirement. 
                                                 
7 One of the main elements of the 2002 law, implemented in 2003 was to remove the earnings related 
element.   35 
 
It is recognised that the current pension system is unsustainable and reforms have been 
legislated to switch fully funded model from 2014. For those with at least 10 years of 
social tax payments, a first pillar ‘Employment Pension’ will be available comprised of 
two parts: 1) a flat rate Basic (or minimum) Pension and 2) an additional element 
reflecting years of contributions prior to the reform. The Employment Pension will be 
financed by a 26% contribution, split between employer and employee. The new second 
pillar will consist of Individual Funded Pension Accounts financed by a 10% contribution 
(5% worker and 5% state up to a ceiling after which the contribution from workers is 
tapered, so that high income workers pay the full 10%). A zero pillar ‘Social Pension’ for 
those without 10 years of social tax payments  will be set at 80% of the Basic Pension.  
Thus the Armenian system will contain elements of both the Kazakh and Kyrgyz reforms 
and combine both PAYG and funded elements as well as a social safety net. 
 
What will be the implications for older people? The ILO estimates that 93% of current 
older people in Armenia are in receipt of pension. Again these estimates are confirmed by 
our own analysis of the 2008 Armenia ILCS (Table 13). Overall, the average per capita 
pension per household with a pensioner was 26,212 per month. In 2008, the $2.15 PPP 
international severe poverty line was equivalent to 12,250 soms a month. Thus the 
average pension was just sufficient to lift an older person out of severe poverty. However 
the minimum social pension, set at 6,800 in 2008 was not.  
 
Table 13 Percentage of households with persons of normal pension age,  average 
amount of pension, Armenia 2008. 
ARMENIA  %  % receiving a 
pension 
Average 
amount of 
pension 
HH with No pensioner  61.0  20.8  21204 
HH with 1 pensioner  27.9  97.5  26734.8 
HH with 2 pensioners  11.0  99.2  49612.5 
HH with 3 pensioners  0.1  100.0  70310.5 
  100%     
Source: Authors’ own analysis Armenia ILCS 2008. 
Note: total number of hh 7872, per capita average pension per household with a 
pensioner 26212. 
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The proposed reforms may have the effect of reducing the fiscal burden and improving 
the sustainability of the system. However they will not impact on the significant 
proportion of the population who are excluded from making social contributions – 
agricultural workers, informal workers etc   who will be increasingly reliant on the social 
pension. Thus the value at which this is paid will be critical in ensuring their welfare. 
Furthermore, as discussed above in relation to the Kazakh reforms, increasing the link 
between work history and pensions also has an important gender dimension which needs 
to be considered. 
 
Finally it is important to also note some of the concerns raised by participants in the focus 
group discussions carried out as part of the preparation for the reforms (Dallakyan, 
Hakobyan and Daniellan, 2008). The results demonstrated that there was little 
understanding of how the current system operates and most people were not aware of the 
upcoming reforms. There were mixed views on the underlying reasons for the expansion 
of jobs without formal labour contracts. Employers thought that people did not want to 
work in the formal sector in order to have higher take home pay, whilst employees 
believed that employers did not want to give them contracts to avoid pensions 
contributions to the government. Interestingly in the context of the move to individual 
accounts, some people voiced concerns against saving accounts because many people had 
lost their savings after the collapse of the Soviet Union. People also questioned whether 
the government had the financial aptitude necessary to administer pension savings 
efficiently and lack of trust in the Government was identified as a major barrier to 
implementing the reforms efficiently. Time will let whether these concerns were 
warranted.  
 
Tajikistan – the role of public versus private transfers 
At independence, Tajikistan inherited a comprehensive system of social protection, 
including social assistance (cash compensation payments, assistance in kind and other 
non contributory benefits and services), social insurance type benefits (pensions, 
unemployment and family benefits), and social care (residential care and social services).  
Since 1991, although the system has come under increasing fiscal pressure, entitlement to   37 
a social insurance old age pension remains largely unchanged
8, and depends upon 
average earnings over a specified number of years and the length of service. Men with a 
full employment record of 25 years and women with 20 years are entitled to receive a full 
pension, equivalent to 55% of average earnings over the two years prior to retirement or 
of the average of any continuous period of five years during working life (Gassmann, 
2004). There has been a gradual increase in the age at which older people can draw their 
pension and from July 2001 this was raised to 63 for men and 58 for women, up from 60 
and 55 respectively during the Soviet period. Opposition parties are now campaigning for 
a return to the soviet era retirement age or even lower (IWPR, 2009). 
 
Table 14 Percentage of older people living in a household receiving support from 
various sources and average amount amongst those who receive it, Tajikistan 2007. 
  Percentage of people of 
pension age 
Mean monthly amount, amongst those 
who receive it 
(hholds with pensioners only) 
Public transfers     
Old age pension  84.9  56.0 
Disability pension  14.8  25.6 
Survivor pension  1.1  17.2 
Private Transfers     
Money from family in 
Tajikistan 
7.5 
165.1 
Money from family abroad  5.1  160.5 
Money from NGO, churches  1.4  291.8 
Remittances     
Money from hh members 
from abroad 
21.1 
783.1 
Source: Falkingham at al (forthcoming) analysis of TLSS 2007.  
Note: total number of observations = 1901 
 
Entitlement is however only half of the story, with indexation and the value of benefits 
being the other. Legally, pensions are meant to be regularly adjusted to overall price 
increases in the country, but in practice such adjustments have been rarely made due to 
limited funds and the average value of social insurance pensions has fallen considerably, 
leaving many older people dependent on other benefits or on private transfers from 
relatives, neighbours and community groups.  Table 14 shows both the percentage of 
older people living in households in receipt of various public and private transfers as well 
as the average (mean) value of the transfer for those households who receive it. Several 
                                                 
8 There has been some rationalisation of the number of exceptions and special categories for pensions.   38 
things stand out. Firstly, the majority (85%) of older people are in receipt of an old age 
pension. However, the average value of this pension is just 56 somoni (equivalent to 
around $30 PPP) a month. On its own the old age pension would not be sufficient to 
provide for a minimum subsistence standard of living. 
 
Secondly, Table 14 also shows that around a fifth of pensioners live in households 
receiving remittances from household members living abroad and around one in ten 
receive money from other family living in Tajikistan or abroad. Although a minority of 
older people receive private transfers and remittances, where they do, these can make a 
significant difference to household income with the average value of remittances from 
household members abroad being 783 Somoni (equivalent to around $420 PPP) per 
month.  
 
As a result of the political and economic disruption, Tajikistan has experienced almost 
unprecedented levels of population mobility.  In common with other ex Soviet republics, 
Tajikistan was affected by a huge wave of out migration of the non titular population in 
the years immediately proceeding and subsequent to independence.  The civil conflict in 
the early post independence years led to the internal displacement of around 500,000 
600,000 people, while an estimated 70,000 100,000 fled to Afghanistan (Foroughi 2002), 
although it is thought that the overwhelming majority of these groups had returned to 
their permanent place of residence by 1997 (Rowland 2005).  Since the mid 1990s, there 
has been a rapid growth in ‘labour migration’ for economic reasons and Tajikistan is now 
thought to have one of the highest rates of per capita labour emigration in the world 
(Erlich 2006). A survey carried out by in 2003 showed that 26% of all households had at 
least one household member working abroad, with the vast majority of migrants being 
men working in Russia (Olimova and Bosc, 2003).  
 
In recent years, remittances have come to constitute an important part of the social safety 
net in Tajikistan (World Bank, 2005). Murghal (2007) estimates that remittances sent by 
absent international migrants to families represented over a quarter of Tajikistan’s GDP 
in 2004. More recent data suggests that remittances had grown to account for 50% of   39 
GDP in 2008 (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal, 2010), putting Tajikistan at the top of the 
world league table, followed by Tonga (38%) and Moldova (31%).  Understanding the 
relative roles of the state (in terms of public transfers) versus the family and community 
in alleviating pensioner poverty is, therefore, particularly pertinent given the recent 
negative impact of the global financial crisis on the flow of remittances. 
 
Table 15 Percentage of pensioners living in income poverty (poverty line 139 
somoni, theta=0.75), before and after transfers.   
  A 
(before all 
transfers) 
B 
(A + 
remittances) 
C 
(B + private 
transfers) 
D 
(C +  public 
transfers) 
Lone pensioner  67.5  60.5  53.9  34.2 
Two person, pensioner hh  68.7  63.9  52.5  43.7 
Pensioner + working age 
adult 
68.8  57.6  48.7  43.5 
Pensioner + 2 or more 
WAA 
46.9  35.7  31.5  26.6 
Pensioner + WAA + 1 2 
children 
51.5  41.3  40.8  35.9 
Pensioner + WAA + 3 4 
children 
56.4  48.7  48.1  43.5 
Pensioner + WAA + 5+ 
children 
52.4  38.7  38.1  35.7 
Pensioner + children  83.6  35.3  32.7  26.4 
All individuals (whole pop)  55.6  44.1  42.5  37.3 
Source: Falkingham at al (forthcoming) analysis of TLSS 2007. 
 
Falkingham at al (forthcoming) have explored the relative role of public and private 
transfers in keeping older people out of poverty in Tajikistan. Column A in Table 15 
shows the percentage of older people living in households with adult equivalent incomes 
below the absolute poverty line of 139 somoni, prior to the receipt of remittances from 
household members abroad, other private transfers and all public transfers including the 
pension. The table distinguishes between older people living in different household types. 
Before transfers, over two thirds of lone pensioners and pensioner couple households 
would be living in income poverty compared with just over a half of the population in 
general. Most strikingly, however, 83.6% of households with pensioners and children but 
no working age adult would be poor. Column B shows the impact on poverty rates of 
receiving remittances. There is a significant drop in poverty for all groups, with the 
reduction being greatest for households containing pensioners and children only, and 
laest marked for one pensioners and pensioner couples. This serves to highlight the fact   40 
that remittances from household members working abroad tend to flow to households 
containing their children; if grandparents are co resident with these children they also 
benefit, but if they live in a separate household (i.e. alone or in a couple only) they are 
less likely to benefit. 
 
Column C in Table 15, then illustrates the impact of other private transfers. Again 
poverty rates fall for all groups. Here however it is the lone and couple pensioner 
households who benefit most with a 7 11 percentage point reduction in poverty rates. 
Finally column D shows the impact of public transfer. The impact of these are most 
marked for lone pensioners.  
 
The magnitude of the reduction in headcount poverty rate is summarised in Table 16. In 
virtually all cases, receipt of private transfers – especially remittances   results in a 
reduction in poverty of greater magnitude than that resulting from receipt of public 
transfers, reflecting their higher average value. For lone pensioners and couple 
pensioners, however, it is the combination of both public and private transfers that results 
in marked falls in poverty, highlighting the fact that many of these households rely on 
both types of transfers and loss of one or other would tip pensioners back into poverty.   
 
Table 16: Change in poverty rate of older people after receipt of transfers 
  B A 
After remittances 
C B 
After private transfers 
D C 
After public transfers 
Lone pensioner   7   6.6  -19.7 
Two person, pensioner hh   4.8  -11.4   8.8 
Pensioner + working age adult   11.2   8.9   5.2 
Pensioner + 2 or more WAA   11.2   4.2   4.9 
Pensioner + WAA + 1 2 children   10.2   0.5   4.9 
Pensioner + WAA + 3 4 children   7.7   0.6   4.6 
Pensioner + WAA + 5+ children   13.7   0.6   2.4 
Pensioner + children  -48.3   2.6   6.3 
All individuals (whole pop)   11.5   1.6   5.2 
Source: Falkingham at al (forthcoming) analysis of TLSS 2007. 
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VI. Policy implications and conclusions 
The countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus inherited extensive and generous 
systems of social welfare that rapidly became unsustainable. Since 1991 the system of 
social protection for older people has been transformed in all countries in the region. 
Even in countries where there has been no reform of the pension system itself, the change 
in the real value of benefits has meant that the system has moved from being one where 
replacement rates were high and the standard of living in old age was guaranteed to one 
where many older people are living on or below the subsistence minimum. 
 
As we have seen in Section III, key trends across the last two decades include: 
•  Declining coverage and a shrinking contribution base 
•  Falling public pension expenditure 
•  Rising contribution rates 
•  Increasing retirement ages 
•  Declining replacement rates and falling benefit rates 
•  Move away from defined benefit PAUG to defined contribution funded systems 
 
The reduction in coverage as some groups such as agricultural and informal workers opt 
out of the formal pension system to avoid the high associated payroll taxes, marks a move 
way from the universal principles of the Soviet system. Accompanying this is the risk of 
increasing exclusion in later life, with greater reliance on minimum pensions and targeted 
social assistance, or on the family. In many countries, remittances now form a growing 
part of household income. However the sustainability of this source of income in the 
longer term remains questionnable. 
 
The move to defined contribution systems increases older people’s reliance on financial 
markets in time of asset price volatility in a region that remains underdeveloped in terms 
of financial instruments and where there is low financial capability amongst population. 
In a survey in Armenia in 2008 only 3% of respondents knew what an asset manager did 
(Dallakyan, Hakobyan and Daniellan, 2009)    42 
One of the most pressing concerns for the future remains the issue of adequacy for 
current and future pensioners. In contrast to many countries in developing countries with 
similar levels of per capita GDP, most countries in this region have a zero pillar social 
pension, and the first pillar often also incorporates a base or minimum pension. The 
critical question is the level at which these are set. Our analysis shows that for those who 
qualify for a contributory pension, the average level of benefits is just above the 
subsistence minimum. However for those on a social pension, benefits are insufficient to 
lift them above this level. Thus although there are well developed social protection 
systems, it is important not to be complacent. Rather the analysis suggests more research 
is needed – both to understanding the reasons behind the widening coverage gap (at a 
time when coverage is expanding elsewhere) and to assess the role played by social 
pensions and how they interact with the contributory system. Unlike elsewhere, the need 
for social pensions has grown out of the contraction of the formal contributory system. 
Many people have accrued contributions but whether these will be sufficient to provide 
an adequate income in old age remains to be seen. 
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